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APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction to hear this Appeal is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 26 (2)(a), U.C.A. §77-18a-l(l)(a) and U.C. A §78-2a-
3(2)(e), whereby an appeal from the court of record in criminal actions may be taken on appeal to 
this Court from a final order for anything other than a first degree or capital felony. Appellant is 
also appealing as a matter of right under Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue 
Defendant/Appellant Watson raises one primary issue for appeal. 
1. Whether the trial court erred in ordering restitution to the Victims' 
Reparations Fund as part of Defendant/Appellant's sentence. 
Standard of Review 
This Court will "accord a lower court's statutory interpretations no particular deference 
but assess them for correctness, as we do any other conclusion of law." Salt Lake City v. 
Emerson, 861 P.2d 443, 445 (Utah App. 1993). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Defendant/Appellant submits the following as representative of determinative law: 
a. Utah Code Ann. §76-3-201(l)(b) 
b. Utah Code Ann. §76-3-201(l)(e)(i) 
-2-
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the case: 
Defendant/Appellant was ordered, as part of her sentence, to pay restitution to the 
Victims' Reparations Fund. Counsel for Defendant/Appellant objected to the order of restitution 
and a hearing was held on the matter. Following the hearing, the judge issued an order that 
Defendant/Appellant pay an amount to be determined by the Victims' Reparations Fund. 
II Course of the proceedings and Disposition at the trial court: 
On or about April 13, 1998, a hearing was held to determine if restitution was appropriate 
under the present set of facts. Following arguments made by Counsel for the State and 
Defendant/Appellant, the trial court ruled that restitution was appropriate. Counsel for 
Defendant/Appellant objected again and filed a Notice of Appeal. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On or about July 23, 1996, a homicide occurred in a northeast neighborhood of Salt Lake 
City, Utah. The victim was Lonnie Durazo. Appellant was originally charged with the murder of 
Mr. Durazo because she allegedly drove the vehicle used during the crime. (R. at 10). All murder 
charges were dropped following plea negotiations. 
Appellant agreed to plead guilty to a charge of Attempted Obstruction of Justice. (R. at 
41). In support of this conviction, the State relied on the fact on August 8, 1997, Appellant sold 
the car allegedly used during the crime. This was over one year after the crime occurred. (R. at 
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41). 
The only admission made by Appellant to the sentencing court that were related to this 
crime consisted of the following: 
(R. at 42, Defendant's Statement) 
"My conduct, and the conduct of other persons for which I am criminally liable, that 
constitutes the elements of the crime charged are as follows: I attempted to dispose of physical 
evidence in a criminal case by allowing it to be sold to another person, to wit: a car." (R. at 42). 
Other statements made by Appellant consisted of the following: 
(Transcript of sentencing, February 2, 1998) (Beginning on P. 6 L. 11) 
The Court: Go ahead, ma'am. 
Ms. Watson: Basically, I just want to say that I know I have been caught in the middle of a 
situation which I guess I have inappropriately acted. I feel really bad about it. It has 
caused me a lot of emotional stress and it is all I guess my fault. I realize, you know, the 
importance of leading a straight life. I feel really bad. I want to apologize to the victim's 
family. 
Then, on April 13, 1998, Appellant again addressed the trial court with the following 
statement: 
(Beginning on p. 8 L.15) 
The Court: Ms. Watson, is there anything you want to say on your own behalf? 
Ms. Watson: Yes. I've spent a lot of time in jail and I have had a lot of time to think. I 
have decided-I took a class while I was in prison and it really woke me up to the way that 
my own life affects me and how I affect others and how I can be productive. I have really 
been putting into practice something I went to every day, something I had to read 13 
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books to go through the required class-the requirements for the class. I have been 
persistent in coming to some understanding of what my life has been up to this point and 
what I would like to take and do with it. I would like to further my education. I want to 
grow up and , I don't know, it is really hard for me to accept this. It is something that has 
been really hard to think that one day, you know, you could be here and the next day you 
could be gone. I really apologize for my misconduct. It is something that won't leave me. 
It is not going to leave me in my life. Forever when I go to sleep, you know, I have a 
conscience. It is not like it is never going to affect me. It affects me everyday. And that 
is my problem, you know. I have got to deal with it but that is what I am working on. I 
would like to apologize again. 
(Transcript of sentencing, page 8, April 13, 1998). 
The sentencing court was aware that it was limited in the sentence it could impose. The 
court stated so during sentencing: 
(Beginning on P. 9 L. 24; April 13, 1998) 
The Court: First of all, let me say that I recognize that there is nothing I can do, quite 
frankly, through this sentencing here today, to really assist the victim's family or bring the 
victim back from the underlying homicide offense. In this particular case, even though this 
obstruction charge is in the context of a homicide case, I am obviously legally bound to 
sentence Ms. Watson for the offense that she pled guilty to and that was an obstruction 
charge and not a homicide charge. 
The Record is void of any statements made by Appellant other than those cited above. In 
light of this, the order of restitution was erroneous and should be vacated by this Court. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Utah Code Ann. §76-3-20l(l)(b) (Supp. 1996) defines "criminal activities" as "any 
offense of which the defendant is convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant 
admits responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of committing the 
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criminal conduct." Appellant was convicted of Attempted Obstruction of Justice because she sold 
the car that was allegedly used during the commission of the crime. The crime occurred on July 
23, 1996 and the car was sold on August 8, 1997. Appellant submits that she never admitted any 
responsibility to the sentencing court for any criminal conduct nor was there any causal 
relationship between the charge she was convicted of and the order of restitution. 
ARGUMENT 
Utah Code Ann. §76-3-201 (Supp. 1996) governs orders of restitution. U.C.A§76-3-
201(l)(e)(i) defines a victim of a crime as "any person who[] the court determines has suffered 
pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities.'' (Emphasis added). 
"Criminal activities" is defined as "any offense of which the defendant is convicted or any other 
criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing court with 
or without an admission of committing the criminal conduct." U.C.A. §76-3-20 l(l)(b) (1996). 
(Emphasis added). The Order of Restitution in the case at bar was unauthorized because 
Appellant never admitted responsibility for criminal conduct related to any losses suffered by the 
victims in this case. 
The United States Supreme Court held in Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 109 
L.Ed. 2d 408 (1990), that an award of restitution is authorized only for the loss caused by the 
specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of conviction. 
The Appellant in that case was originally charged with three counts of theft by a United 
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States Postal Service employee and three counts of use of unauthorized credit cards. Pursuant to 
plea negotiations, Appellant agreed to plead guilty to one of the counts in exchange for the 
government dropping the other five. During the plea proceedings, the government proffered 
evidence that Appellant had stolen more credit cards than were contained in the one count to 
which he was pleading. Appellant's counsel informed the district court that Appellant's plea was 
limited to the one count and that Appellant had not made admissions to anything other than the 
facts pertaining to that count. 
The government proposed at sentencing that Appellant be ordered to pay restitution which 
included losses from counts other than the one to which Appellant had plead. Appellant argued 
that he should be required to pay restitution only for the losses listed in the count for which he 
was convicted. The district court and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit disagreed with 
Appellant. 
The Supreme Court held that the district court's order of restitution was unauthorized and 
reversed the Court of Appeals. The Court held that as a practical matter there was no 
Congressional intent to include in the restitution calculus any losses beyond those caused by the 
offense for which the defendant was convicted. Id. at 418. Moreover, the Court held that had 
Congress intended to permit a victim to recover for losses stemming from all 
conduct attributable to the defendant, including conduct unrelated to the offense of 
conviction, Congress would likely have chosen language other than "the offense," 
which refers without question to the offense of conviction. 
Id. (Emphasis added). 
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The government argued on appeal that the practice of plea bargaining would undermine 
victims' ability to recover fully for their losses. The Court addressed this argument with a 
commonsensical analysis: 
[i]f a prosecutor chooses to charge fewer than the maximum possible number of 
crimes, the potential recovery of victims of crime is undoubtedly limited, but so 
too is the potential sentence that may be imposed on a defendant. 
Id 
One year after the Hughey decision, the Tenth Circuit held that an Order of Restitution, 
which encompassed losses stemming from charges which did not result in convictions, was 
unauthorized and thus was illegal and constituted plain error on the part of the district court. 
United States v. Wainwright, 938 F.2d 1096 (10th Cir. 1991). 
In that case, the Appellant was originally charged with a seven-count indictment. 
Pursuant to plea negotiations, Appellant plead guilty to one of the counts. At sentencing, the 
district court ordered Appellant to pay restitution that included losses from the dismissed counts.1 
The court held that since the Order contained losses stemming from charges which did not result 
in a conviction, the order was illegal and must be vacated. Id. At 1099. 
The Utah Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of restitution in State v. Galli, 345 
l
. The loss suffered by the banks that had been defrauded totaled $9,927.00. The count 
Appellant was convicted of totaled a loss of $700.00. The district court ordered restitution in the 
amount of $4,963.00, which was half the loss identified by the banks and included $350.00 of the 
$700.00 loss identified in the count appellant was convicted of. On remand, the court instructed 
that the order of restitution include only the $350.00 which represented a portion of the loss 
identified in the count which resulted in a conviction. 
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Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 1998 WL 312808 (Utah). The Court held that in order for restitution to be 
applicable, a defendant must admit responsibility to the sentencing court. Id at 8 (citing U.C. A. 
§76-3-201(l)(b))). The "plain wording of section 76-3-201 (l)(b) requires that the defendant 
admit[ ] responsibility to the sentencing court..." (Emphasis in original text). 
The Appellant in that case argued the trial court misinterpreted U.C. A. §76-3-201 when it 
ordered him to pay restitution to his family after he absconded from the jurisdiction, resulting in 
the family forfeiting bail. The Court held that since Appellant did not admit responsibility for bail 
jumping, "bail jumping [was] not a criminal activity for which restitution was proper under 76-3-
201(4)(a)(i)." Id at 8. The Order of Restitution was properly determined to be erroneous. 
In applying the law outlined above to the facts of the case at bar, it is clear that the Order 
of Restitution in this case was erroneous. Appellant was originally charged with criminal 
homicide. (R. at 9). Pursuant to plea negotiations, Appellant agreed to plead guilty to Attempted 
Obstruction of Justice. (R. at 41-47). The facts supporting this conviction stemmed from the fact 
that Appellant sold the vehicle used in the crime. (R. at 42). The crime with which Appellant was 
originally charged occurred on or about July 23, 1996, and the car was sold on or about August 
8, 1997. (R. at 41-42). 
The government argued in the Hughey case that plea bargains, like the one in the case at 
bar, ultimately undermine victims' ability to recover their losses. However, as the Supreme Court 
established in that decision, the law supports that the potential recovery of victims of crime is 
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limited when a prosecutor chooses a lesser charge, and it follows that the potential sentence must 
also limited. See, Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. at 418. 
The losses related to the conviction of Attempted Obstruction of Justice are not, in any 
plausible interpretation, related to the Order of Restitution. In other words, Appellant did not 
cause the victim's losses or damages by selling the car over one year after the crime was 
committed. Thus, an Order which requires Appellant to pay restitution to the Victims' 
Reparations Fund was erroneous. 
U.C.A. §76-3-201(l)(b) (Supp. 1996) defines criminal activities as 
any offense of which the defendant is convicted or any other criminal conduct for 
which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing court with or without 
an admission of committing the criminal conduct. 
The Supreme Court held in Hughey that had Congress intended to permit a victim to 
recover for losses stemming from all conduct attributable to the defendant, including 
conduct unrelated to the offense of conviction, Congress would likely have chosen language 
which would refer to conduct other than the conviction." Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. at 
418. Appellant asserts the same argument here. Had the Utah Legislature intended a victim to 
recover from losses stemming from all conduct attributable to Appellant, it would be included in 
U.C.A. §76-3-201. A fundamental principle "of statutory construction is that unambiguous 
language in the statute itself may not be interpreted so as to contradict its plain meaning." 
Johnson v. Utah State Retirement Bd, 770 P.2d 93, 95 (Utah 1988). 
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Appellant finds no language in §76-3-201 that indicates that a victim shall be compensated 
for losses stemming from charges that did not result in a conviction. Since the conviction was 
Attempted Obstruction of Justice, which resulted from Appellant selling her vehicle, that 
conviction is not related to the victim's losses in this case, and thus the Order of Restitution 
should be vacated. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant prays that this Court vacate the Order of Restitution because her conviction was 
not related to the victim's pecuniary damages nor did she admit responsibility for any other 
criminal conduct to the district court. 
DATED this / I day of January, 1999. 
PARKER, FREESTONE & ANGERHOFER 
David C. Cundick 
Attorney for Appellant/Defendant 
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AUG H 1998 
David C. Cundick, #4817 
PARKER, FREESTONE & ANGERHOFER, PC 
50 West 300 South, #900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)328-5600 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF S.ALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ORDER OF 
: , RESTITUTION 
Plaintiff, 
-vs- : 
Case No. 971015103 
ELLIE WATSON, : 
: Judge Medley 
Defendant. : 
On the 22nd day of June, 1998, the Court heard arguments on the defendant's opposition to 
payment of restitution. The defendant was represented by her attorney, David C. Cundick. The 
State of Utah was represented by Carlos Esqueda. The Court, having considered the arguments of 
counsel and for good cause appearing, now enters the following 
O R D E R 
1. Defendant Ellie Watson is hereby ordered to pay restitution in such amount as have 
been made of the Victim's Reparation's Fund relating to the death of Lonnie Durazo. 
oy. •...*-.*•£>/"£* "••'* Gio,* 
1 
2. Adult Probation and Parole is to contact the Victim's Reparation's Fund and report 
to the Court the amount of restitution owed and to contact the defendant to arrange for monthly 
payments of such amount. 
DATED this / / day of August, 1998. 
BY T I ^ COURT 
./nU^L 
The Honorable Tyrone E. Medley, *.. -
Third/D/strict Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Vincent Meister, 
Attorney for State of Utah 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the -2th- day ofJtrfy, 1998,1 caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following parties at the addresses indicated. 
Vincent Meister, Esq. 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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